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As the degree of global trade integration increased, corporate taxation became a border-crossing matter that obliged govern-
ments to reassess the tax attractiveness of their jurisdictions. The U.S. and Canada are two major players of today’s trade
landscape and the corporate tax environment of these two countries impact MNEs investment decisions. Historically, Canada
offered a more favourable tax environment compared to its neighbour. However, the U.S. tax reform, TCJA, challenged
Canada’s tax attractiveness. This paper aims to assess the similarities and differences of both countries’ tax systems after the
tax reform based on the tax attractiveness criteria. Following, the paper examines lessons that can be derived for Canada to
regain its strong position in the global tax attractiveness scenery. The U.S. and Canada have the potential to set an example
for lawmakers and show that it is possible to create a corporate taxation environment that preserves governments’ interest
whilst creating attractive taxation policies in the eye of MNEs.
Keywords: Corporate taxation; United States; Canada; tax attractiveness; Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.
1. Introduction
“Taxes are what we pay for a civilised society".1 Taxes
are the main source of revenue for governments to create a
state of social welfare for their citizens. Despite this, taxes
still do not have positive connotations in both individual and
corporate taxpayers’ minds.
In our increasingly globalised world, trade hardly re-
mains within one country’s borders. To minimise their tax
liabilities and to exploit the deficiencies in tax systems, multi-
national enterprises (MNE) are dispersing their business op-
erations around the globe. Since tax payments and related
expenditures on corporate income account for a great per-
centage of a company’s expenses, taxation is a central aspect
of investment decisions. Thus, countries need to adjust their
fiscal policies to increase their tax attractiveness.
The main motivation of this thesis is to understand which
country offers a more favourable fiscal environment for MNEs
by looking at the dynamics behind international tax competi-
tion between countries. Alongside being two dominant play-
ers of the global trade landscape, the U.S. and Canada are
1This statement was delivered by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in a United
States Supreme Court opinion in 1927 (Compania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue).
ideal candidates for a cross-national comparison due to their
geographical proximity and close economic links. Since they
are both federal states, these countries are also very simi-
lar on a fundamental level with regard to their political sys-
tems. This similarity continues throughout taxation policies.
However, over the years differences in aspects like headline
tax rates allowed Canada to gain significant corporate tax at-
tractiveness advantage over the U.S., and to create a more
favourable investment environment. This advantage partly
faded in 2018 when the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) came
into force in the U.S., which was a major tax reform that drew
tremendous public attention. TCJA has not only changed the
decades-old taxation policies of the U.S. but also had signifi-
cant implications on an international level. Considering that
Canada is one of the countries that is on the frontline when
dealing with TCJA, it is almost forced to respond to the re-
form of its neighbour.
Academia, businesses and civil society have been dis-
cussing the U.S. tax reform and its implications for a long
time. Various research papers and articles were written in
academic journals in recent years. The prevailing argument
is that the corporate tax advantage that Canada has enjoyed
for decades is in jeopardy and significant implications are on
the horizon. Thus, Canada should respond to the U.S. tax
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reform in a grounded and consistent manner. In this regard,
the similarities between two tax systems give Canadian poli-
cymakers an opportunity to learn from the pivotal elements
of the U.S. tax reform.2
The principal contribution of this bachelor thesis is the
comparison of the tax systems of the U.S. and Canada with
regard to corporate taxation from the perspective of their tax
attractiveness. Since, as yet, the corporate taxation of both
countries has not been analysed by focusing on the similar
and diverging aspects, this thesis aims to close the existing
gap in the literature. Thus, the question that is being asked
is: What are the similarities and differences of MNEs’ income
taxation in the U.S. and Canada after the U.S. tax reform?
Considering how similar corporate taxation in the U.S. and
Canada is, it is also crucial to ask: When moving forward,
what can Canada learn from the U.S.?
The comparison criteria to assess the similarities and dif-
ferences are defined on the basis of three indexes: Tax At-
tractiveness, Tax Complexity and Tax Competitiveness Index.
More details with regard to the indexes are going to be dis-
cussed in the following section when describing the prior
literature written on the topic. These three indexes have a
very large number of parameters, whereby many of them are
common. For the purposes of this thesis, 12 criteria are cho-
sen in total. Firstly, the parameters are filtered based on the
fact of whether they are related to corporate taxation or not.
Following, among those filtered parameters, the ones that
came across in all three indexes are chosen.3 In order to
create a clearer overview, the parameters are grouped into
four categories, whereby each category has been further di-
vided into two to five subcategories. Firstly, “basic elements"
are separated into corporate income tax rate and group tax-
ation regime. The second category is “cost recovery" which
has been subcategorised as capital cost recovery, loss carry-
forward and loss carryback. The category “tax incentives"
is separated into research and development and patent box
regime. Lastly, “international tax regulations" covers general
anti-avoidance rules (GAAR), controlled foreign corporation
(CFC) rules, thin capitalisation rules, transfer pricing rules
and treaty network.
The structure proceeds as follows: Following this intro-
duction, this thesis starts by giving an overview of the tax-
ation system of both countries and by briefly describing the
prior literature. Parts of a tax system can only be accurately
assessed in the context of the whole system. Therefore, it is
important to understand how both countries’ legal systems
are structured before examining any discrete aspects. In the
third part of the thesis, the criteria of corporate taxation are
going to be compared.4 The last part answers the second
part of the research question and derives lessons for Canada
on the basis of comparison criteria from the previous section.
2See McKenzie and Smart (2019b, pp. 3–4).
3See the Appendix 1 for a detailed explanation of the methodology fol-
lowed for the comparison.
4See the Appendix 2 for a comprehensive overview of the results of the
comparison.
The thesis concludes by summarising the findings of the pre-
vious two sections.
2. Overview and Current Developments
2.1. Prior Literature
The “Canada – U.S. Tax Comparisons" by Shoven and
Whalley5 is the only existing comprehensive comparison
study so far. It discusses the similarities and differences
of taxation systems of both countries beyond the taxation
of corporate income. The book consists of several essays,
whereby it does not define any criteria to compare corporate
taxation and to assess the tax attractiveness of both coun-
tries. Even though the book is a good start to understand
the fundamental concepts, it has lost its relevance in some
respects due to ever-changing tax systems of the U.S. and
Canada.
In addition, well-known journals such as the Canadian
Tax Journal have published articles that compare certain cor-
porate taxation aspects of both countries. In general, how-
ever, the number of comparison studies as such is scarce, and
they do not provide a comprehensive comparison of corpo-
rate taxation systems.6 Instead of comparing corporate taxa-
tion to assess the tax attractiveness, it has been a more popu-
lar research topic to look at the international spillover effects
of TCJA, specifically its effects on Canada.7
As described in the introduction, the criteria derived from
the three indexes lay the groundwork of this thesis. Tax At-
tractiveness Index aims to make an overall assessment of a
country’s tax environment to evaluate how attractive it is for
corporate investment decisions.8 Tax Complexity Index cov-
ers the criteria that signal the complexity of the tax code and
tax framework which are important investment decision fac-
tors for MNEs.9 Lastly, Tax Competitiveness Index measures
the competitiveness and neutrality of countries’ tax codes
among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) countries.10 The parameter of these in-
5Shoven and Whalley (1992).
6Clark and Klemm (2015) highlights how important corporate income
tax rate for cross-national investments is, and looks at the rates of major
economies, including the U.S. and Canada. Farrar “Canada’s Thin Capi-
talization Rules: The Need for a Subjective Approach" (2006) compares
the thin capitalisation rules of Canada with the G-7 countries, including
the U.S.McKenzie/Smart “Policy Forum: Business Tax Reform in the United
States and Canada" (2019) focuses on the most significant aspect of corpo-
rate taxation, the tax rate, and compares it before and after TCJA. Zodrow
“Policy Forum: Corporate Income Taxation in Canada" (2008) examines
again the corporate income taxation policy of Canada and compares it to
the U.S. with regard to its competitiveness.
7Bazel, Mintz, and Thompson (2018) emphasises that the new tax reform
of the U.S. introduced many ground-breaking changes that will make the
country a much more attractive jurisdiction to invest in. Thus, the authors
suggest a review of the Canadian tax system. Harris, Keen, and Li (2019)
discusses provisions of TCJA that will affect Canada. Alongside fundamen-
tal and conventional components of the tax reform, the effects of newly in-
troduced provisions such as the foreign-derived intangible income and the
global intangible low-taxed income are considered. Lastly, the article also
gives suggestions for possible responses.
8See Schanz, Keller, Dinkel, Fritz, and Grosselfinger (2017, pp. 3–4).
9See Hoppe, Schanz, Sturm, and Sureth-Sloane (n.d.).
10See Bunn and Asen (2019, pp. 1–2).
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dexes would allow an objective and comprehensive compar-
ison of countries’ tax systems from the standpoint of their
tax attractiveness. Nevertheless, a study as such has not yet
been conducted, hence this thesis will be the first in this area.
Considering the importance of an attractive tax environment
as a decisive factor for investments, this thesis will show the
stance of the U.S. and Canada and it would also help MNEs
that are planning on expanding their business operations in
North America to make wiser investment decisions. Addi-
tionally, the research would be a good starting point for poli-
cymakers who are trying to improve the tax attractiveness of
their countries.
2.2. Taxation in the U.S.
The Constitution-based federal republic of the U.S. gives
all levels of government, federal, state and municipality,
the authority to legislate and regulate. The taxation of in-
come occurs in the U.S. separately on federal and state level,
whereas taxing power of states is not absolute and depends
on the restrictions of the Congress.11 The taxes paid on the
state and local level are fully deductible when computing
federal income tax to avoid duplications.12
Tax is by definition the transfer of a portion of the income
to the government and it does not give the taxpayer the right
to a quid pro quo in return.13 Among the several elements
of the U.S. federal tax system, income taxes are the primary
component. The tax liability is calculated on the taxable in-
come. However, the U.S. legal system does not provide a sin-
gle unified definition of income and is intended to “capture
all income without committing itself to a specific definition
of what it means".14 This is partly the result of individually
added new provisions to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
to achieve a specific policy role without taking their interac-
tion with the existing provisions into consideration. Due to
the fact that overlapping and duplicated provisions continue
throughout the overall federal tax system, the taxation sys-
tem of the U.S. is viewed as complex and multidimensional.15
Public Law No. 115-97, publicly known as the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act, was signed by President Donald Trump in 2017.
TCJA is the most comprehensive tax reform of the U.S. in over
three decades. The new or changed regulations affected ev-
ery taxpayer in the country, whereby TCJA’s most prominent
and fundamental changes relate to corporate income taxa-
tion rules and the tax treatment of pass-through corporate
income. In the near future, it is expected that the law will
stimulate the economy positively, however it remains ques-
tionable whether the long-term impact will be as positive as
lawmakers hoped.16
11See Brackman (2016, pp. 1–3.).
12See Pomerleau (2018).
13See Burman and Slemrod (2013, p. 6); Sherlock and Marples (2019, p.
5).
14McCaffery (2012, p. 36).
15See Brackman (2016, pp. 165–166).
16See Gale, Gelfond, Krupkin, Mazur, and Toder (2018, p. 590).
Despite the existence of merely two fundamental tax
regimes, worldwide and territorial taxation, corporate tax-
ation differs to a great degree between countries and offers
little uniformity. Until the enactment of TCJA in 2018, the
U.S. was one of the few remaining developed countries who
still implemented worldwide taxation. The pure worldwide
taxation regime taxes all income earned by corporations
domiciled in the home country. However, the U.S. regime
included alterations from the pure form and allowed MNEs
to defer the taxation of the foreign-earned income until this
income has been repatriated and made available to the par-
ent company. Despite the benefits granted by the deferred
taxation rules, the far higher corporate income tax rate of 35
per cent compared to most of the other OECD countries put
the U.S. in a disadvantageous position. This also created an
unfavourable investment environment for MNEs in the U.S.
and incentivised them to engage in aggressive tax planning
strategies.17
The cession of the worldwide taxation system was one of
the most significant changes that was embarked with TCJA.
Notwithstanding, lawmakers opted for a modified territorial
regime instead of the pure territorial form since the latter
would have created strong incentives to shift the taxable in-
come and real investment activity to low-tax jurisdictions and
to shift deductions to the U.S. Currently, the foreign-source
income is free from taxation in the U.S. and is only taxed in
the jurisdiction where the revenue is derived from. Since the
repatriation of the foreign earnings does not create a tax lia-
bility in the U.S. any longer, under the new territorial regime
corporations are more inclined to repatriate their earnings.18
The changes in MNEs’ tax structuring have been seen imme-
diately after TCJA, for instance, Apple announced in the first
quarter of 2018 that it would repatriate 94 per cent of its
foreign income.19
Prior to TCJA, Internal Revenue Service tried to limit
profit shifting by regulating transfer pricing rules. Neverthe-
less, their efforts were not successful, since among 40 per
cent of globally profit shifting, U.S. based MNEs shift com-
paratively more than MNEs from other countries.20 Thus, the
Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax was introduced, which is a
provision that applies only to large MNEs and imposes min-
imum tax on otherwise tax-deductible payments between a
U.S. corporation and its subsidiary. In addition, TCJA also es-
tablishes other provisions that aim to limit destructive profit
shifting such as the foreign-derived intangible income (FDII)
and global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI).
Another significant change that was introduced with
TCJA is for pass-through businesses. Since the income of
the latter is taxed as the owner’s personal income at the in-
dividual rate21, their income is not subject to the corporate
17See Fischer (2015, pp. 1028–57).
18See Yang, Lord, and Saito (2019, pp. 69–83).
19See Wakabayashi and Chen (2018) as cited in Yang et al. (2019, pp.
74–75).
20See Tørsløv, Wier, and Zucman (2018, pp. 3–4); Tax Policy Center (n.d.).
21See Merriam-Webster (n.d.).
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income tax rate. Though TCJA changes apply to all corpora-
tions including pass-through entities, specific modifications
in form of deductions are introduced which will expire after
2025.
2.3. Taxation in Canada
Income tax was first introduced as a temporary measure
in Canada to raise revenue for the World War I. However, it
continued after the war and income tax has become the sin-
gle most important revenue-raising method in the country.
In the meantime, the income taxation proved to be useful
since it became a mechanism for centralising power in the
federal government which has been previously reserved to
the provinces. Over the years, Canadian lawmakers contin-
ued to refine their Income Tax Act (ITA) to cope with the
challenges brought by globalisation for its corporate taxpay-
ers.22
Canadian income tax system is composed of a multitude
of federal, provincial and municipal taxes. Taxing power is
divided between the federal government and its political sub-
divisions based partially on the differentiation between direct
and indirect taxation, whereby the federal government is re-
sponsible for direct taxation and there is no constitutional
limit to the federal taxing power. Despite this, there is no at-
tempt to make a distinction between direct and indirect tax-
ation in the statute. As a result, if the legislation is firmly
decided on describing a tax as “direct", there is the possibil-
ity of declaring any tax as direct.23 Provinces have then the
power to levy the direct taxation on the income earned in
their jurisdiction, whereby all of the 10 provinces and the
three territories levy income tax. The federal government
of Canada collects the tax on behalf of the provincial gov-
ernments according to the tax collection agreement between
them. Even though provincial governments must adopt the
federal income tax base in consideration, they apply their
own tax base and provide tax credits.24
3. Comparison of Corporate Taxation in the U.S. and
Canada
3.1. Basic Elements
3.1.1. Corporate Income Tax Rate
Corporate income tax is the direct tax on the profits of
a corporation. It describes the rate at which each dollar of
profit is taxed. The enforcement of high corporate income
taxes by the governments reduces the after-tax rate of return
of corporate investments and increases the cost of capital. As
a result, companies become reluctant to invest and the over-
all economic output decreases. In a broader sense, a greater
tax burden also leads to higher prices for end-consumers and
reduces the salaries of employees. Therefore, the rate at
22See Christians (2018, pp. 2–4).
23See Petrie (1952, pp. 7–9).
24See Ault, Arnold, and Cooper (2019), chapter “Canada".
which the corporate income is taxed has a remarkably signif-
icant impact on a country’s economy, and governments that
offer lower corporate income tax rates are seen as more at-
tractive.25
The taxation of corporate income occurs in the U.S. both
on the federal and state level. Prior to the enactment of TCJA,
the federal corporate income tax rate was 35 per cent and
was notably high compared to other OECD countries. In or-
der to increase the competitiveness of U.S. based MNEs and
re-establish the tax attractiveness of the country, the federal
corporate income tax rate was reduced to 21 per cent. Also,
progressive taxation on the federal level was eliminated, thus
the federal corporate income tax rate is a flat rate for all com-
panies regardless of their income.26
In accordance with the similarity of their governmental
organisation, both the U.S. and Canada impose taxes on both
the federal levels and on the level of their political subdivi-
sions. In Canada, these subdivisions are provinces and terri-
tories. Canadian federal corporate income tax rate is 15 per
cent after the general tax deduction, which is considerably
lower than the headline rate in the U.S. General tax deduc-
tion is applicable for corporations that are not subject to pref-
erential treatment. For instance, Canadian-controlled private
corporations are not allowed to utilise this deduction.
Different from the U.S., Canada imposes progressive tax-
ation on corporate income, whereas the first 500.000,00 CAD
(600.000,00 CAD in Saskatchewan) of active business in-
come is subject to a net federal rate of 9 per cent.27 Pro-
gressive taxation is seen as a mechanism for governments to
support their small businesses and is an attractive feature of
a country’s tax landscape. Thus, Canada has an advantage
on this matter compared to the U.S. The corporate income
taxes imposed by political subdivisions of both countries vary
greatly, whereby the combined corporate income tax rate is
on average 26,47 per cent in Canada and 25,77 per cent in
the U.S.28
3.1.2. Group Taxation Regime
Generally, under income tax law, a company is treated as
a single separate taxable unit. This policy is derived from
the traditional separate entity doctrine, under which a com-
pany is examined as a distinct legal entity and separate from
its shareholders. However, with globalisation, the landscape
of the trade has changed, and corporate groups have be-
come more influential.29 In 2017, although 100 largest MNEs
worldwide accounted for about 0,1 per cent of the total num-
ber of MNEs, their sales made up around 10 per cent of the
world’s gross domestic product.30
The rise of corporate groups started to challenge the ex-
isting separate entity doctrine and a new policy was created:
25See Bunn and Asen (2019, p. 6).
26See Internal Revenue Service (2019b).
27See Canada Revenue Agency (2005).
28See OECD (2020).
29See Ting (2013, pp. 3–4).
30See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
(2018, p. 26).
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the enterprise doctrine. This new provision implies that sepa-
rate entities under one corporate group are treated as a single
taxable unit. Following this change, countries worldwide re-
acted by adjusting their tax law. Currently, the responses vary
in a large spectrum, whereby some jurisdictions apply rela-
tively restrictive group taxation regimes and others employ
more comprehensive consolidation schemes.
Group taxation regimes have two key functions: Intra-
group loss offset and tax-free intra-group asset transfer. If
desired, lawmakers can replace these two functions with full
consolidation.31 Since group taxation regime allows to re-
duce the tax burden by filing one single consolidated tax re-
turn, the existence and scope of group taxation regimes are
attractive features of a country’s tax environment.32
The group taxation regime of the U.S. was first introduced
in 1917 as the primary form of group tax relief. The regime
has experienced many changes over its long history and the
policy has targeted companies that sought to decrease their
taxes on their profits.33 Section 1501 of IRC gives a group of
corporations the right to opt in to file a single consolidated
tax return to offset intra-group losses. An election to file a
consolidated return needs pre-approval of the Internal Rev-
enue Service commissioner.34 In order to be qualified for the
consolidation, the parent company must possess ownership
of at least 80 per cent of both value and voting power of
the subsidiary.35 The primary advantage of this provision is
to combine the income of the subsidiaries into a single tax-
able income figure. In addition, intra-group dividends can be
ignored, and the recognition of the gains or losses of intra-
group transactions can be deferred. Nevertheless, this provi-
sion only applies to domestic entities, whereby foreign incor-
porated subsidiaries must file a separate return. Exceptions
exist for certain Mexican and Canadian subsidiaries. Follow-
ing, problems arise for incorporated groups when faced with
states’ diverse and uncoordinated filing requirements. Since,
while some states require separate filing for each corpora-
tion, others allow consolidation. In states where separate re-
porting is enforced, a corporation is obligated to determine
separate income even though the entity is part of a consol-
idated group for federal tax purposes.36 In addition, since
partnerships are not corporations their return cannot be con-
solidated.37
On the other hand, there is no existing group taxation
regime in Canada. Thus, differing from the U.S. taxation
provisions, under Canadian ITA, each corporation is required
to file a separate return.38 The absence of group taxation
provisions under Canadian law is a feature that reduces the
attractiveness of the country.
31See Ting (2013, pp. 13-18, 32).
32See Schanz et al. (2017, p. 6).
33See Ting (2013, p. 70).
34See Brauner (2011, p. 70); Ting (2013, p. 301).
35See Trump (2020, p. 4).
36See Brauner (2011, p. 305).
37See PricewaterhouseCoopers International Ltd. (PwC) (2020b).
38See Dumalski and DeGrace (2019, p. 4).
3.2. Cost Recovery
3.2.1. Capital Cost Recovery
Investments promote growth in an economy; thus, tax
systems have to be designed in a way that they are able to at-
tract capital. Depreciation allowances play a major role when
MNEs decide whether to invest in a jurisdiction.39 Since in
tax systems based on income an immediate write-off of the
costs of capital investments is not allowed, businesses are
required to spread the write-off of these costs over several
years. The idea behind is that the legally allowed deductible
amount reflects the depletion in value of an asset.40
However, write-offs in the future years prove as less valu-
able compared to earlier write-offs as a consequence of the
decreasing time value of money. Consequently, firms can-
not deduct fully the present value of the costs of their capital
investments. Due to this decrease in the present value of
depreciation allowances, true business costs are understated
whereas the taxable income is being overstated. Overall,
countries that offer faster write-off provisions become more
attractive for MNEs, since their depreciation schedules serve
to lower down the tax base easily.41
Capital cost recovery system of the U.S. is based on an
asset classification system and it spreads out the deprecia-
tion costs over the estimated useful life of an asset.42 De-
preciation deductions may be taken for tangible properties
that are used for business purposes or properties that pro-
duce income, such as rental property. The modified acceler-
ated cost recovery system is available for properties placed
after 1986, under which each class has a prescribed recovery
period and depreciation method. General cost recovery pe-
riods depend on the type of tangible property and are three,
five, seven, ten, 15, 20, 27,5 and 39 years (31,5 years for
properties before 13 May 1993). Allowed depreciation meth-
ods are declining-balance method and straight-line method,
switching from the point when the latter maximises the de-
preciation deduction. Taxpayers may switch to an alternative
depreciation system and use only the straight-line over pre-
scribed useful lives. Prior to the enactment of TCJA, a special
50 per cent first-year depreciation allowance applied, which
has been replaced by the new regulation with a 100 per cent
first-year bonus depreciation deduction for certain qualified
properties that are acquired and placed in service after 27
September 2017 and before 1 January 2023. Tangible prop-
erties with a recovery period of 20 years or less are defined
as qualified property under the modified accelerated cost re-
covery system, and special depreciation allowance reduces
the basis before regular depreciation deductions.43
In Canada, similar to the U.S., capital cost allowances are
calculated on the basis of pooled asset classes, whereby an-
nual depreciation allowances are given as a prescribed rate
39See Nam and Radulescu (2005, p. 5).
40See Brazell and Mackie (2000, pp. 532–533).
41See Bunn and Asen (2019, pp. 8–9).
42See Brazell and Mackie (2000, p. 531).
43See Ernst & Young LLP (2019b, p. 1818); PricewaterhouseCoopers In-
ternational Ltd. (PwC) (2020a).
E. Gürlek / Junior Management Science 6(3) (2021) 489-506494
and applied on a declined-balance basis. Businesses cannot
deduct the full amount in the year of acquisition of deprecia-
ble property and have to disperse the capital costs over sev-
eral years. In response to TCJA, in the Fall Economic Update
of 2018, the federal government of Canada introduced three
important changes with regard to capital cost allowances to
“enhance business confidence".44 According to the new pro-
visions, the cost of machinery and equipment used for manu-
facturing or processing of goods may be immediately written-
off. Since the manufacturing industry is capital intensive and
highly mobile, this new incentive will help the industry to
cope with the changes brought by TCJA. Secondly, businesses
are given the chance to immediately write-off the full costs
of clean energy equipment. Furthermore, the federal gov-
ernment introduced the Accelerated Investment Incentive,
under which businesses can deduct their capital investment
costs at an accelerated rate. This accelerated rate is approxi-
mately equal to three times the usual first-year deduction and
it will gradually phase out by 2028.45 The temporary accel-
erated deduction provisions of both countries increased the
allowed amount of the first-year deductions. In a way, the
Fall Economic Update of Canada has replicated capital cost
recovery provisions of TCJA to establish a similar attractive-
ness for capital investments as the U.S. in its jurisdiction.
3.2.2. Loss Carryforward
Companies occasionally have unused tax credits in a
given tax year which is mostly the case in times of economic
downturn. Since tax carryforwards imply future tax sav-
ings, they are valuable assets to the firm. In most countries,
companies are allowed to offset their current losses against
future profits. In other words, if the company has a positive
tax base in the future, it can deduct its tax loss carryforwards
to reduce its tax burden.46 Hence, the amount of a tax loss
carryforward is a considerable contribution to the company’s
value47 and it helps to “shelter a part of the firm’s future
income from taxation".48 Loss carryforward provisions of a
country dictate the number of years a company is permitted
to carry forward its losses. Countries with more generous
provisions are more attractive to MNEs.49
According to the U.S. IRC, net operating losses (NOL)
arise when deductions exceed gross income in a given tax
year. NOLs generated before 1 January 2018 may be carried
forward for up to 20 years. TCJA updated this provision, and
currently, NOLs generated after that date can be carried for-
ward indefinitely. Nevertheless, for NOLs without carryfor-
ward limitations, the deduction is capped to 80 per cent of
the taxable income which has been calculated without regard
to the deduction.50 Other limitations for the carryforward
44Department of Finance Canada (2018, p. 55).
45See Ernst & Young LLP (2019a, p. 266); PricewaterhouseCoopers Inter-
national Ltd. (PwC) (2019).
46See Streitferdt (2013, pp. 163–164).
47See Betker (1995, pp. 3–18) as cited in Streitferdt (2013, p. 12).
48Sarkar (2014, pp. 803–804).
49See Bunn and Asen (2019, p. 8).
50See PricewaterhouseCoopers International Ltd. (PwC) (2020a).
of NOLs are defined in Section 382, whereas special rules
apply for deductions subsequent to a reorganisation and af-
ter changes in corporate ownership. On 27 March 2020, the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act
was enacted which provided relief from relatively strict pro-
visions of TCJA. One of those provisions was the elimination
of the income limitation of NOLs for carryforwards for post-
TCJA years through 2020.51
Different from the U.S. provisions, ITA of Canada dif-
ferentiates among capital losses, allowable business invest-
ment losses, non-capital losses and farm losses. Non-capital
losses are realised from regular business activities and they
can be deducted against any source of income. The unused
portion of the non-capital losses can be carried forward for
up to 20 years.52 Similar to the U.S., after the prescribed
time period the rights to offset losses against income becomes
permanently unavailable. Much like the provisions of IRC,
Canadian lawmakers have limited the carryforward option
in case of an ownership change. After a majority acquisition
loss carryforward can only be deducted if the acquired busi-
ness will continue to operate with reasonable profit expecta-
tions. Also, deduction is allowed in cases where the losses
are used to offset the same or similar business income. The
idea behind this loss streaming rule is to avoid acquisitions
that solely aim to utilise loss carryforwards of acquired com-
panies.53
3.2.3. Loss Carryback
Loss carryback allows companies to deduct current year
losses against past year profits. Analogously to loss carryfor-
wards, loss carrybacks reduce a company’s overall tax bur-
den. Thus, countries that allow companies to carry back their
losses far into the past are more attractive from the tax per-
spective.
In the U.S., prior to TCJA, NOLs were permitted to be
carried back for two years to obtain a refund. TCJA changed
this rule and eliminated the loss carryback provision com-
pletely.54 Nevertheless, this provision was recently modified
with the CARES Act, whereby corporate taxpayers are now
permitted to carryback their NOLs for the years 2018, 2019
and 2020 for up to five years. Taxpayers have the option to
choose one particular tax year for carryback. However, in
general, once a carryback is claimed, then it must be exe-
cuted for all five years. As a result, it is expected that loss
carrybacks introduced with the CARES Act will provide eco-
nomic relief for companies that are affected by the Coron-
avirus pandemic.55
On the other hand, differing from the U.S. provisions,
non-capital losses may be carried back for three years in
Canada to offset gross income arising in those tax years. In
the event that the carryback losses have not been utilised
51See Singer, Bray, Kershaw, Shulman, and Crouch (n.d.).
52See Canada Revenue Agency (2017).
53See Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd. (n.d.).
54See Internal Revenue Service (2019a).
55See Luscombe (2020, p. 3).
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in the prescribed time frame, they become permanently un-
available to the taxpayer.56 Compared to the U.S., Canada
has not yet introduced any relief provisions for business taxes
with regard to losses encountered due to the pandemic. De-
spite the fact that the CARES Act introduces provisions lim-
ited to a short time period, it is still important when consid-
ering the tax attractiveness since it shows the U.S. govern-
ment’s determination on supporting its businesses.
3.3. Tax Incentives
3.3.1. Research and Development
Tax incentives used to promote research and develop-
ment (R&D) business activities are adapted widely among
many countries and they are a tool for national growth and
job creation.57 It has the characteristic of reducing the costs
of carrying out R&D activities by alleviating MNEs’ tax lia-
bility. Since R&D investments are large expenses, tax incen-
tives that reduce the after-tax R&D costs are important when
determining the tax attractiveness of a jurisdiction.58 The
economic rationale is derived from the statement that social
returns of inventions are higher than the private returns. In
other words, the end-product of an R&D activity can be ap-
propriated in a private enterprise to a limited extent com-
pared to public purposes. Thus, companies would be reluc-
tant to invest in R&D activities without any incentives.59
The policy design of tax incentives of R&D activities can
be volume-based or incremental, whereby the simpler design
is, the higher the welfare is going to be due to the alleviated
administrative burden. The U.S. and Canada both employ
a volume-based policy, whereby the total amount of quali-
fied R&D activities is taken into account. Furthermore, tax
incentives covered by R&D are tax credit, enhanced deduc-
tions and depreciation allowances for R&D activities. The
tax credit allows firms to directly deduct the amount deter-
mined by their tax rate from their tax liability born by their
R&D expenditures. The U.S. and Canada both implement the
method of granting tax credit as a way to incentivise R&D ac-
tivities.60
In the U.S., in addition to the federal tax credit, many
states offer separate R&D tax credits that are generally at
a lower level than the federal credit rate. The traditional
research tax credit is 20 per cent of the qualified research
expenses that exceed the pre-defined base amount whose
calculation relies on data between 1984–1988. Due to the
complexity of defining the base amount, only a few compa-
nies choose to report the traditional research credit. Alter-
native simplified credit is another option that is more widely
used, under which the credit rate is 14 per cent of the ex-
cess expenses, whereby the threshold is 50 per cent of the
averaged past three consecutive years’ qualified research ex-
penses. Lastly, the U.S. government offers targeted research
56See Canada Revenue Agency (2017).
57See Goulding and Goulding (2013, p. 18).
58See Schanz et al. (2017, p. 8).
59See Arrow (1962, pp. 616–619).
60See Correa and Guceri (2013, pp. 5–6, 10–11).
credits that, as the name suggests, focus on specific types of
R&D activities. MNEs that qualify for targeted research credit
cannot use the regular research credits for the same qualified
expenses. The R&D tax credit system of the U.S. does not ex-
clude any industries, thus all companies that undertake qual-
ified research expenses are eligible for a tax credit.61
Canada has a relatively lucrative tax credit system com-
pared to other countries around the world and it is organised
under the Scientific Research and Experimental Development
(SR&ED) Tax Incentive Program. SR&ED federal investment
tax credit is 15 per cent for all qualifying R&D expenditures
carried out in Canada, and it is used to reduce federal tax
payable. On the other hand, different from the U.S., Canada
does not offer many diverse credit options besides an addi-
tional enhanced refundable tax credit of 35 per cent for Cana-
dian controlled private corporations on eligible expenditures
of three million Canadian dollars. For R&D expenditures that
exceed this amount, there is also the option to earn a non-
refundable 15 per cent tax credit.62
Qualified expenses under the U.S. R&D tax credit sys-
tem include wages and salaries of employees and all types
of supplies other than depreciable assets. On the other hand,
Canada only takes into account materials that are used for the
purposes of the research. As a result, the U.S. IRC qualifies
more items as eligible for R&D tax credit purposes since “sup-
plies" cover a wider range of items than “materials", therefore
it gives companies more discretion in determining the activ-
ities that constitute as R&D expenditure.63
Additionally, similar to the U.S. state tax credit, Canada
has separate provincial/territorial credits that range from 3,5
per cent to 20 per cent. MNEs both in the U.S. and Canada
are allowed to carry forward their tax credits for 20 years and
claim them back in future periods. SR&ED of Canada also
offers an immediate deduction for all qualified expenditures,
under which there is the option to carry forward and deduct
in future years.64
3.3.2. Patent Box Regime
Historically, R&D tax incentives have been seen as the
only effective way of promoting innovative business activi-
ties. However, in the early 2000s, the current form of the
patent box regime has emerged, and it has been found that
incentives subsidising the income stream from innovation ac-
tivities result with more favourable outcomes in the long run
than incentives that subsidise investments in innovation, i.e.
R&D tax incentives. Patent box regime has the objectives of
stimulating domestic innovation and combatting erosion of
the domestic tax base. It reaches these objectives by featuring
a reduced tax rate on income derived from the commerciali-
sation of royalties or giving a tax exemption on a certain per-
centage of the latter.65 The existence and scope of a patent
61See Aronshtam and Kane (2018, pp. 271–273).
62See Canada Revenue Agency (2020).
63See Laplante, Skaife, Swenson, and Wangerin (2019, pp. 89–91); SRED
(2017).
64See Aronshtam and Kane (2018, pp. 35–37); OECD (2019, p. 1).
65See Bradley, Dauchy, and Robinson (2015, pp. 1047–1048, 1069).
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box regime increase the tax attractiveness of a jurisdiction
substantially.
Prior to the introduction of BEPS project Action 566, the
policymakers in the U.S. have not been showing serious in-
terest in the development of patent/innovation box regimes.
However, with the introduction of the modified nexus stan-
dard, the U.S. government felt obliged to respond to hinder
redirection of R&D activities by U.S. MNEs. In July 2015, the
Innovation Promotion Act67, publicly known as the Boustany-
Neal discussion draft was released. This Act amended IRC by
adding new provisions related to the innovation box and it
was stating that the enactment of U.S. innovation box would
allow to increase the competitiveness of U.S. companies, but
this Act has never passed the Senate.68
Until the enactment of TCJA, no further discussions re-
lated to the discussion draft took place. Although TCJA does
not include any direct patent/innovation box regimes, it in-
troduced two special provisions: FDII and GILTI. According
to FDII provision, 37,5 per cent of the income derived from
the commercialisation of the licences of intellectual property
is subject to deduction. Nevertheless, on the opposite side,
GILTI provision imposes a minimum tax on the global in-
come, including income derived from licencing of intellec-
tual property. Thus, some commentators argue that FDII and
GILTI act as “carrot and stick", and only create an indirect
patent/innovation box regime.69
As was the case with the U.S., Canadian policymak-
ers have been discussing a possible patent box regime for
years, but it has not yet been implemented on the federal
level. However, regimes on a provincial level have been
adopted. British Columbia was the first province in Canada
who granted a reduced tax rate of 2,75 per cent for inter-
national patent income. The province does not enforce the
product to be developed locally, whereby companies with a
permanent establishment in the province are entitled of the
tax rate reduction. The second provincial patent box regime
was then introduced in Quebec in 2016 to bridge the gap
between innovation and its commercialisation, where the
tax on qualifying patent income was reduced to a rate of 4
per cent. However, Quebec’s patent box regime only applied
to the manufacturing industry and it reduced the tax rate for
qualified innovative manufacturing corporations, whereby
intellectual property has to be at least partly developed in
Quebec.70
3.4. International Tax Regulations
3.4.1. General Anti-Avoidance Rules
Taxpayers may engage in tax planning strategies to re-
duce their tax payable. Notwithstanding, in cases, where
tax avoidance strategies have reached a drastic level, gov-
ernmental interference becomes necessary. Therefore, GAAR
66OECD (2015).
67Goodlatte (2015).
68See Atkinson (2015, pp. 5–8); Traub and Kummer (2015, pp. 3–4).
69See Shaviro (2018).
70See De Luca et al. (2016, p. 3).
are implemented by many jurisdictions to restrict impermis-
sible tax avoidance.71 The definition of the latter can become
problematic because of its ever-changing and unpredictable
nature; however, it is broadly characterised as being incon-
sistent with the spirit of tax law since these transactions are
often abnormal, artificial and they lack a commercial sub-
stance. Furthermore, there is an additional complexity born
with GAAR, since there is a clash between taxpayers’ entitle-
ment to lawful tax planning, and the governments’ need to
protect its tax revenue from impermissible tax avoidance.72
On the other hand, for MNEs the existence of GAAR provi-
sions are a drawback since they prefer having freedom in
their tax planning strategies. A country that imposes clearly
defined, strict GAAR rules is not considered as attractive com-
pared to other jurisdictions without any anti-avoidance pro-
visions.
In the U.S., in accordance with the common law tradition
at the federal level, the judiciary decides ultimately, whether
there is a tax avoidance transaction and whether resulting
tax benefit from this transaction should be denied. The anti-
avoidance doctrine was first developed with the case Gre-
gory v. Helvering73 and stated that economic substance of a
transaction is the deciding factor in its classification. Lack of
economic substance signals that a business has been solely
transacted with the purpose of tax minimisation.
In 2010, the economic substance doctrine was codified
with the enactment of Healthcare and Reconciliation Act in
IRC Section 7701(o).74 Nevertheless, the codified version
has drawn criticism with the argument that it “provided a
roadmap to successful avoidance"75 compared to the prior ju-
dicial version. Thus, despite the codification of the doctrine,
federal courts still hold the power to determine whether a
transaction is part of a tax avoidance strategy or has an eco-
nomic substance within it.76 In addition to the economic sub-
stance doctrine, U.S. courts rely on other doctrines such as
substance over form, step transaction and sham transaction
doctrines.77
In Canada, taxpayers’ general right to arrange its affairs
in a way that its tax burden is reduced, originated from the
“Duke of Westminster principle"78, under which legitimate
right to engage in tax planning has been recognised by the
Canadian courts. However, the Stubart79 case has shown the
need for a general provision aimed to limit abusive tax avoid-
ance and following, a robust GAAR provision has been en-
acted in 1988. The Canadian anti-avoidance provision has
been defined in Subsection 245 of ITA.
Different from the U.S. GAAR, Canadian GAAR works un-
71See Waerzeggers and Hillier (2016, p. 1).
72See Kujinga (2012, pp. 42–43).
73Gregory v. Helvering (1935, para. 2).
74See Prebble and Prebble (2010, p. 27).
75See Avi-Yonah and Pichhadze (2017, p. 10).
76See Brown (2012, pp. 609–610).
77See Larsen, Cordero, Bowen, Denault, and D’Alessandro Jr. (2018, p.
21).
78Duke of Westminster v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1935).
79Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen (1984).
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der a cascade mechanism which gives little leeway to taxpay-
ers. Firstly, Subsection 245(2) determines whether there is
a tax benefit resulting from the transaction. If there is one,
it is then to decide whether the transaction is motivated for
tax purposes or bona fide non-tax reasons according to Sub-
section 245(3). Lastly, Subsection 245(4) examines to see
if tax benefit resulted from a misuse of specific taxing provi-
sions of ITA. As is the case with the U.S., subjective nature
of GAAR is reflected in the Canadian provisions, thus statu-
tory interpretation by the courts is an essential element.80
In addition to GAAR provisions, the U.S. and Canada have
also specific anti-avoidance rules that go beyond the general
provisions and apply to narrowly prescribed set of transac-
tions81, whereby these rules will be examined separately in
the coming parts.
3.4.2. Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules
Global trade landscape is dominated by a high level of
global integration which complicates the taxation of corpo-
rate income and makes it a border-crossing issue. In cases
where profits are generated both in the home country of the
parent company and in the host country of a subsidiary, it be-
comes problematic in which jurisdiction this income should
be taxed. Each entity of the corporate structure is regarded
as a separate taxpayer; thus, each subsidiary becomes subject
to income tax in the host country.
Following, most countries impose domestic income tax
when the income has been repatriated and allow methods to
eliminate double taxation that arises from taxing the same
base multiple times. Nevertheless, the parent company owns
essentially the profits and hence has the right to determine
when, if at all, the income should be repatriated to the home
country. Considering that base protection and enforceability
of tax system are integral parts of a country’s optimal policy
design, when profits escape the reach of the home country, it
possesses a threat to the enforceability of tax collection.82
In order to control aggressive tax planning and constant
migration of profits, many high-tax countries introduced CFC
rules. These rules impose a direct tax on foreign subsidiaries
by including non-repatriated income into the domestic tax
base. Whether to enforce CFC rules or not depends gener-
ally on three criteria: Control criterion, tax level criterion
and source of income. Control criterion requires the share-
holder to be in control of financial decisions of the entity in
a foreign country and the ability to make decisions related
to tax avoidance. On the other hand, the tax level criterion
obliges a fixed minimum tax level, below which incentives
for profit shifting emerge. Lastly, the source of income should
be passive income, whereby any highly mobile income that
makes income-shifting possible, qualifies, e.g. foreign per-
sonal holding company income. Since the CFC rules greatly
increase the total tax burden of MNEs, countries that im-
80See Hashimzade and Epifantseva (2017, p. 108).
81See Marley and Tremblay (2005, p. 105).
82See Clifford (2019, pp. 44–46).
pose these rules are seen as less attractive for investment
purposes.83
The U.S. was the first country worldwide who introduced
CFC rules in 1962. It took over a decade for other capital-
exporting OECD countries, including Canada, to adopt simi-
lar rules.84 Under U.S. law, CFC is a foreign corporation that
is owned by over 50 per cent by U.S. shareholders, whereby
certain types of income are included in the taxable income of
the U.S. shareholders. Types of income that must be included
in the tax base are defined in subpart F of IRC which includes
foreign-based company sales income and foreign-based com-
pany service income, among others. U.S. shareholders are by
definition, U.S. persons who own more than 10 per cent of a
foreign corporation’s voting stock or own more than 10 per
cent of the total value of all classes of a foreign corporation’s
stock.85 Thus, different from Canada, the U.S. implements a
two-step ownership test, whereas first, the ownership of the
corporation is examined, and afterwards the shareholders’
ownership is assessed. Following, the dividends of the CFC
received by U.S. shareholders are eligible for a full “dividend-
received deduction", which means that dividends obtained
are tax-free since CFC did not make any tax payments to the
government.86
Nevertheless, after the enactment of TCJA, IRC Section
951 Subtitle A is introduced, and it required U.S. sharehold-
ers to include the amount of GILTI, independent of whether
the amount is distributed or not. As a result, TCJA’s GILTI
rules expanded the scope of CFC rules beyond passive in-
come, thus it is now applicable to all income generated by
a CFC if the income is considered to be low-taxed. In other
words, TCJA does not define any tax havens, it rather taxes
all income that is subject to a foreign tax rate lower than
13,125 per cent. GILTI is despite its name, is not limited to
low-taxed income from intangible assets, and encompasses
U.S. shareholders’ pro-rata share of CFC’s total net income
less 10 per cent return on depreciable tangible property.87
GILTI is included in the U.S. shareholder’s income and a de-
duction equal to 50 per cent of the full amount is allowed. In
addition, the shareholder has the right to claim a foreign tax
credit for 80 per cent of the foreign taxes paid or accrued by
a CFC.88
Another provision that was enacted with TCJA was the
Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax which imposes a minimum
tax to the tax base of large corporations with gross receipts of
500 million dollars or more, and in addition to corporations
that have deductions that exceed 3 per cent of their total de-
ductions paid to foreign related companies. Base Erosion and
Anti-Abuse Tax, as the name suggests, levy a direct tax on
base-eroding payments and acts as a “backup to GILTI".89
83See Schanz et al. (2017, p. 5).
84See Arnold (2012, p. 478).
85See Traub and Kummer (2015, p. 8).
86See Yang, Poon, and Chang (2018, p. 20).
87See McGill, Karch, Feeley, O’Banion E., and Crouse (2018, pp. 11–13).
88See PricewaterhouseCoopers International Ltd. (PwC) (2020b).
89See Dueñas (2019, p. 18).
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Canadian CFC rules are organised extensively under the
Subsection 91(1) of ITA and named as foreign accrual prop-
erty income rules.90 Similar to the U.S. provisions, foreign
accrual property income regime obliges a Canadian resident
shareholder to include its share of passive income of its con-
trolled foreign affiliate, whereby it is irrelevant whether or
not this income has been distributed. In order to be qualified
as a controlled foreign affiliate, the majority of the voting
shares must be owned directly or indirectly by a Canadian
corporation. Foreign accrual property income covers income
from investment business and income that is derived from
the trading or dealing in indebtedness. In case of income is
derived from specific activities, it encompasses the income if
it accrues to the benefit of the Canadian taxpayer under a
tracking arrangement.91
3.4.3. Thin Capitalisation Rules
The trade-off theory of corporate finance states that firms
pick their capital structure by trading off the benefits of tax
shield from debt against its costs, i.e. financial distress and
agency costs. A tax shield is a reduction in tax expenditures
due to tax-deductibility of interest expenses.92 In addition to
the advantages raised by this asymmetry of tax treatment, dif-
ferences in tax rates across countries result with profit shift-
ing and reduction of the overall tax burden.
MNEs allocate their debt to high-tax countries or provide
loans internally to related entities in those jurisdictions in or-
der to deduct higher interest expenses from their tax base.93
Consequently, entities in low-tax countries are equipped
with equity, whereas entities in high-tax countries have large
amounts of debt on their balance sheets. In order to limit ex-
cessive debt financing and intra-group financial transactions,
lawmakers in high-tax countries have adopted thin capital-
isation rules. These rules aim to prevent profit shifting to
a large extent by limiting the deductibility of interest pay-
ments from taxable income. Thin capitalisation rules differ
greatly across countries and usually have a high degree of
complexity. They can also be arranged in a way that they are
only binding for certain selected industries.94 Since interest
tax shield is an important financial instrument to reduce tax
payable of corporations, provisions that limit interest deduc-
tions are not favoured by MNEs. Hence, they reduce the tax
attractiveness of a country.
The U.S. government imposes clearly defined thin capital-
isation rules which have been tightened with the enactment
of TCJA. The current allowed debt-to-equity ratio is 1,5:1.
Section 385 of IRC contains provisions that evaluate whether
an instrument claimed to be debt is considered as debt or eq-
uity for the U.S. tax purposes. If the transaction is legally
prohibited, capital loaned to an entity by a related party may
90See Nosikova (2015, p. 4).
91See Dumalski and DeGrace (2019, p. 3); PricewaterhouseCoopers In-
ternational Ltd. (PwC) (2020b).
92See Berk and DeMarzo (2017, pp. 552–556).
93See Merlo and Wamser (2014, pp. 27–28).
94See Schanz et al. (2017, p. 10).
be characterised as equity by Internal Revenue Service. Cor-
respondingly, its interest expense deductions may be disal-
lowed, and its principal repayments and its interest expendi-
tures are considered as distributions and they are subject to
withholding tax.
If the instrument is considered as debt, the business inter-
est expense deductions apply.95 These deductions have been
modified with the enactment of TCJA and they have been
limited to 30 per cent of the adjusted taxable income. Deduc-
tions apply broadly to the business interest of any taxpayer;
hence it is irrelevant whether they are foreign or U.S. per-
sons or whether they are related or unrelated entities. For
tax years before 2022, the adjusted taxable income equals
approximately to earnings before interest, taxes, deprecia-
tion, and amortisation, whereby after that date it will be de-
creased by depreciation and amortisation. Carry forward of
disallowed interest expenses into future years is allowed. In
case of lending from a foreign lender, interest expenses must
be paid prior to performing their deduction.96
As stated in Subsection 18(4) of ITA, Canada’s thin cap-
italisation rules, rely on mandatory debt-to-equity ratios to
prevent illegitimate diversion of profits to low-tax jurisdic-
tions.97 These provisions have been subject to amendments
over the years. According to Section 385 provisions, Cana-
dian lawmakers give a specified debt-to-equity ratio. Cur-
rently, Canadian thin capitalisation rules restrict the ability
to deduct interest expenses paid by a resident corporation
to a specified non-resident shareholder or related persons on
debts exceeding the defined debt-to-equity ratio of 1,5:1. A
specified shareholder is someone, who owns 25 per cent or
more of a corporation resident in Canada, either by fair mar-
ket value or by voting rights, with other related persons that
do not deal at arm’s length.98 These rules apply to corpo-
rations resident in Canada, trusts, non-residents’ Canadian
branches and partnerships of which a corporation resident
in Canada is a member. In addition, thin capitalisation rules
apply to certain back-to-back loan arrangements.99
3.4.4. Transfer Pricing Rules
MNEs manipulate transfer prices when they conduct
transactions with related companies in a way that their tax
liabilities are minimised. They do so by setting high prices
for the sale of goods or services to related entities in high-tax
countries. As a result, they reduce the overall tax burden
of the organisation and repatriate higher profits to low-tax
countries. Hence, from the standpoint of MNEs non-existing
or relatively vaguely organised transfer pricing rules increase
the attractiveness of a jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding, for governments in cases when there
are no existing restrictions with regard to the prices set for
95See Ernst & Young LLP (2019b, pp. 1821–1822).
96See PricewaterhouseCoopers International Ltd. (PwC) (2020a).
97See Nitikman (2000, pp. 20–21).
98See Shafer (2013, p. 1).
99See Ernst & Young LLP (2019a, pp. 267-268).
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intra-group transactions, transfer pricing becomes a sole de-
vice of tax evasion. Furthermore, tax authorities try to re-
cover this revenue loss by restricting the setting of transfer
prices by MNEs. Nevertheless, this intrusion of tax author-
ities may cause inefficiencies that damage consumer prices
and MNEs’ organisational choices.100 An intrusion as such
also distorts the main point of MNEs’ cross-national activity
which is to cut costs by locating their organisation more effi-
ciently around the globe.101 In order to solve these conflict-
ing problems, OECD has suggested a set of guidelines102 to
help safeguard tax authorities interests while alleviating mar-
ket distortions raised by abusive transfer pricing strategies.
Transfer pricing rules worldwide are organised based on the
arm’s length principle, under which the price that would pre-
vail between two unrelated entities in a competitive market
is predicated.103
The primary legislation of the U.S. transfer pricing rules
is defined in Section 482 of IRC (Regulations 1.482-1 to.
1.482-9), also known as Treasury Regulations. It ensures
that controlled transactions’ profits are correctly reflected,
and a controlled taxpayer is on par with an uncontrolled tax-
payer. Along establishing a general standard applicable to
transactions between related entities, Section 482 also in-
troduces an additional standard for transfers of intangible
properties. Although the arm’s length principle has not been
explicitly stated, it has been embodied by the statutory lan-
guage by establishing a tax parity between controlled and
uncontrolled transactions. According to Section 1.482-1 of
Treasury Regulations the “best method rule" should be used
to ensure the arm’s length pricing, insomuch as the best trans-
fer pricing method is the one with the most reliable arm’s
length result.104 This method should be based on the crite-
ria of comparability of uncontrolled transactions and quality
of data and assumptions. Acceptable transfer pricing meth-
ods in transfers of tangible properties are comparable prof-
its method, comparable uncontrolled price method, cost plus
method, among others. Unspecified methods may also be
used by taxpayers if they end in with an arm’s length result.
Furthermore, the U.S. rules for transfer pricing do not pred-
icate on the guidelines issued by OECD and there are no ref-
erences to the latter in Treasury Regulations. Advance pric-
ing agreements can be reached between taxpayers and the
Internal Revenue Service, under which an arm’s length pric-
ing method is agreed upon for the upcoming intercompany
transaction.105
Canada’s status as being a high-tax jurisdiction has be-
come stronger after the corporate tax rate reduction in the
U.S., which also caused transfer pricing rules gaining im-
portance in the Canadian taxation system. Transfer pric-
ing rules are contained in Section 247 of ITA, whereby, as
100See Behrens, Peralt, and Picard (2014, pp. 651–652).
101See The Economist (1993, para. 8).
102OECD (2017b).
103See Taklalsingh (2019, pp. 3–4).
104See Ernst & Young LLP “Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide" (2019), p.
1822.
105See Larsen et al. (2018, p. 11).
is the case with the U.S., OECD’s guidelines play a limited
role for Canada’s transfer pricing provisions. As stated in
GlaxoSmithKline Inc. case106, OECD’s provisions may only
be used as interpretative aid and only Section 247 of ITA is
legally binding. Following, although, Section 247 does not
prescribe any particular method, it applies the arm’s length
principle by comparing controlled transactions to compara-
ble arm’s length transactions. However, ITA does not specify
any particular method, thus “the selection of the most appro-
priate pricing method depends [. . .] on the assessment of the
comparability of transactions".107 Acknowledged methods
are similar to the ones recommended in the OECD’s guide-
lines and include comparable uncontrolled price method, re-
sale price, profit split method, among others. Although all
methods are accepted, in the past courts have shown a prefer-
ential position to traditional transaction methods, specifically
comparable uncontrolled price method. As in the U.S., ad-
vance pricing agreements with the Canada Revenue Agency
are possible to provide more tax certainty for taxpayers.108
3.4.5. Treaty Network
Double taxation treaties play a crucial role as a policy
tool to promote cross-national investment activity.109 These
treaties have two primary objectives: avoiding double taxa-
tion in international transactions and preventing tax evasion
by MNEs. There is a consensus that double taxation treaties
are mean to reduce withholding taxes on passive income.
Since they eliminate to a large extent the investment uncer-
tainty that a company may encounter when investing over-
seas, they also help to promote foreign direct investments.110
As a result, an increase in foreign direct investments spurs
economic growth and hence raises the tax revenues of gov-
ernments. Thus, the number of effective tax treaties that
are in force boosts the attractiveness of a country for MNEs.
Double taxation treaties are largely influenced from the stan-
dards defined by the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income
and on Capital111 and United Nations Model Double Taxa-
tion Convention112, and they shift the taxing rights from the
source state to the resident state.113
The U.S. receives the biggest share of worldwide foreign
direct investments due to the relative openness of its econ-
omy. A vast majority of the U.S. foreign direct investments
comes from the countries with which the U.S. has signed a
tax treaty in the past. Currently, the U.S. has 64 bilateral
tax treaties in force.114 In the past, the U.S. had viewed its
treaties as negotiated agreements with strong bilateralism.
Nevertheless, the U.S. government has decided in 1976 to
106Canada v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc. (2012, para. 20).
107Alberta Printed Circuits Ltd. v. The Queen (2011, para. 167).
108See Suarez (2019, pp. 797–799).
109See Kunka, Stasio, and Zagler (2020, pp. 575–576).
110See Daniels, O’Brien, and von der Ruhr (2015, p. 1000).
111OECD (2017a).
112United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed
and Developing Countries (2017).
113See Braun and Fuentes (2016, pp. 384–385).
114Deloitte (2020).
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Criteria Differences
Corporate Income Tax Rate Federal tax rate in the U.S.: 21 per cent
Combined average tax rate in the U.S.: 25,77 per cent
Federal tax rate in Canada: 15 per cent
Combined average tax rate in Canada: 26,47 per cent
Group Taxation Regime There is no group taxation regime in Canada.
Capital Cost Recovery Different rates for temporary accelerated deduction provisions.
Loss Carryforward Carryforward in Canada is allowed for 20 years.
In the U.S carryforward allowance is indefinite but is capped to 80 per cent of
the taxable income.
Loss Carryback Canada allows carryback for three years.
No carryback allowance in the U.S.
Research and Development Eligible R&D expenditures are more broadly defined in the U.S. than Canada.
Patent Box Regime Two provinces in Canada have employed patent box regimes.
In the U.S. there is an indirect patent box regime with FDII and GILTI.
General Anti-Avoidance Rules GAAR provisions of Canada work under a cascade mechanism.
The U.S. GAAR relies on many doctrines.
Controlled-Foreign Corporation
Rules
GILTI provision expands the scope of eligible income beyond passive income.
Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax of the U.S. acts as back-up to the CFC rules.
Thin Capitalisation Rules The U.S. limits interest deductions to 30 per cent of adjusted taxable income,
whereby there are no limitations in Canada.
Tighter thin capitalisation rules in the U.S.
Transfer Pricing Rules N/A
Treaty Network Canada has a larger number of bilateral tax treaties than the U.S.
Figure 1: Brief overview of the differences
publish a draft “U.S. Model" which is essentially based on the
OECD’s Model, and hence it is very similar in nature. How-
ever, there are few substantial deviations such as corporate
residence. In the U.S. tax treaties, the latter is determined
solely based on its place of organisation, whereas this is not
the case in OECD’s Model and in the United Nations’ Model.
These deviations are a reflection of the uniqueness of the U.S.
tax treaty provisions.115
The treaty network of Canada has grown tremendously
since 1976 when the link between treaties and Canada’s ex-
emption system for the taxation of active foreign-sourced in-
come has been established. According to this provision, in
case of profits are generated in a designated treaty nation,
Canadian MNEs may repatriate their foreign-sourced active
income to Canada tax-free. Different from the U.S. treaty net-
work, all the Canadian tax treaties are based on the OECD’s
Model and on the United Nations’ Model. However, specific
economic relations with a particular country are reflected in-
dividually in each treaty.
Compared to the U.S., Canada has a larger treaty net-
work. Currently, the country has 93 bilateral treaties in force
and four additional treaties that are signed but not yet in
force.116 Among existing tax treaties of Canada, the most
important one is the treaty with the U.S.117 The rationale be-
hind this statement derives from the strong economic links
115See Brauner (2017, pp. 21.23).
116See Department of Finance Canada (2019).
117United States - Canada Income Tax Convention (1985).
between two countries; whereas the U.S. receives the biggest
share of foreign direct investments of Canada.118
4. Lessons for Canada from the U.S.
Historically, Canada provided a more attractive tax envi-
ronment for MNEs compared to the U.S., thus the country en-
joyed an inward shift of foreign corporations’ profits. Never-
theless, this tax advantage faded with the enactment of TCJA.
While it is not yet certain how large the consequences of the
reform are going to be, it is a certain fact that Canada’s tax at-
tractiveness started diminishing. The measures that were in-
troduced with the Fall Economic Update in response to TCJA
were temporary in nature. Hence, a robust and internation-
ally competitive reform is necessary for Canada to regain its
position in global trade scenery.119
When preparing a reform as such, Canadian lawmakers
could look at the elements of the U.S. tax system. This part of
the thesis derives lessons for Canadian government from the
results of the comparison in the previous section. The results
of the comparison indicated that among these 12 criteria, all
of them except “transfer pricing rules" can be identified as
different, nonetheless, the degree of divergences varies. Two
criteria, group taxation and loss carryback, differ the greatest
since while one country has the respective provision whereas
118See Cockfield (2017, pp. 118–119).
119See McKenzie and Smart (2019a, pp. 2–4, 22).
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the other has not. Broadly speaking for five120 out of 12 cri-
teria the differences are of disadvantage for Canada. In this
part, in addition to the results of the comparison, the views
of commentators from governmental agencies and academia
are included. Since the commentators also formulated their
suggestions while taking the U.S. system into account, the
lessons that were derived from the previous part of this the-
sis and their views are harmonised to a large extent.
As indicated earlier, lower corporate income tax rate
makes a country more attractive and draws capital invest-
ment. In this regard, Canada has lost its competitive edge
over the U.S. with the reduction of the U.S. corporate income
tax rate. Moreover, it has been found that companies in non-
tax haven jurisdictions are more sensitive to movements in
corporate tax rate which makes a Canadian response even
more necessary.121 However, critics’ views vary with regard
to the amount of reduction in corporate income tax rate
whereas some do not recommend turning this to “a race to
the bottom"122, and others suggest a reduction of about 10
per cent.123 Canadian policymakers should weigh the pros
and cons of both approaches, nevertheless, the need to re-
spond to the drastic reduction of the U.S. tax reform stays
further on necessary.
Canada currently has no group taxation regime. Imple-
menting a group taxation regime would move some MNE ac-
tivity to Canada since it allows corporations to reduce their
overall tax burden by transferring losses and filing a single
consolidated tax return.124 However, the case of the U.S.
shows that when adding group taxation provisions into its
law, Canadian lawmakers should also consider their nega-
tive aspects: The possibility of consolidation cleared the way
for aggressive tax planning strategies in the U.S. which gave
rise to the need of specific anti-abuse provisions.125 Con-
sequently, group taxation regime is a double-edged sword,
hence when implementing similar provisions to the ones in
the U.S., policymakers must work thoroughly to balance its
positive and negative aspects.
As stated above in section 3.2.1, the Canadian govern-
ment announced temporary accelerated capital cost recovery
provisions to raise capital investments as a response to the
measures implemented with TCJA. It has been argued how-
ever that these temporary measures are inadequate, and they
make already bafflingly organised ITA of Canada even more
complicated.126 Thus, when moving forward, instead of im-
plementing further interim measures, the Canadian govern-
ment should prefer more grounded changes. A proposal is to
implement a “cash-flow tax" that taxes the economic rents of
an entity. This model would allow immediate deduction of
all capital expenses and eliminate the interest deductions. As
120These are corporate income tax rate, group taxation regime, research
and development, patent box regime and thin capitalisation rules.
121See McKenzie/Smart (2019), pp. 16-17.
122See Stratton (2019, p. 19).
123See McKenzie/Smart (2019), pp. 16-17.
124See Donnelly and Young (2002, pp. 431–432).
125See Brauner (2011, pp. 301–301, 311).
126See Stratton (2019, p. 11).
a result, all sectors will be influenced equally and distortions
between different asset classes will be eliminated.127
In case of loss offset rules, the time value of money en-
hances the importance of the number of time periods for
which the carryover is allowed. Since loss carrybacks are ret-
rospective, the losses can be fully utilised. Notwithstanding,
loss carryforwards can only be partially utilised because of
the declining time value of money. As a result, the longer
a company carries forward its losses, the more the value of
the latter decreases.128 Thus, an increase in Canada’s car-
ryforward allowance in years similar to the increase in the
U.S. is not expected to have a major impact. Canada already
has a relatively long carryforward time period which can be
considered as attractive.129
As discussed above in section 3.3, tax incentives are im-
portant means to promote innovation in a country. SR&ED
program of the Canadian government provides good incen-
tives for R&D activities; however, innovation activities of
Canadian corporations are still considered as inadequate. Re-
search suggests that many corporations leave the country
before they grow and thus do not commercialise their in-
tellectual properties in Canada.130 In order to change this
phenomenon, federal measures are necessary. For instance,
a patent box regime on the federal level would encourage
companies to engage in R&D activities and also increase the
attractiveness of Canada.131 Another direct solution would
be to increase the funding of SR&ED program. Furthermore,
the Canadian government could ensure corporations that are
looking to expand to new jurisdictions that their intellectual
property rights are going to be protected in these countries.
This can be provided by assuring increased protections in
trade agreements.132
With regard to GAAR provisions, there are not many sig-
nificant differences between the U.S. and Canadian provi-
sions. Nonetheless, one can say that since Canadian provi-
sions are organised in a more detailed way, they are stricter
than the U.S. counterpart. In overall, based on the previ-
ous comparison, there are not any lessons to be derived for
Canada.
As noted previously, CFC rules of the U.S. have been revis-
ited with TCJA. As a consequence of the new GILTI rules, it
is possible for Canadian-source income of MNEs to be sub-
ject to GILTI tax. This takes place in cases when the tax
rate of Canada is below 13,125 per cent due to reductions
in the tax rate, e.g., R&D tax credits, which in the outcome
127See McKenzie and Smart (2019b, pp. 17–19).
128See Donnelly and Young (2002, p. 441).
129Tax Attractiveness Index (Schanz et al. (2019)) recognises countries
that allow loss carryforward for more than 20 years as fully attractive (with
the index value "1"). Since Canada allows carryforward up to 20 years, it has
the score 0,5 in the index. For the purposes of this thesis, due to the extreme
proximity of Canada’s allowance to the given threshold, the country can be
categorised as attractive.
130See The Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce
(2018, pp. 17–18).
131See De Luca and Hausch (2017, pp. 59–60).
132See The Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce
(2018, pp. 17–18).
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lowers the average tax rate on an MNE’s worldwide income
and makes it subject to GILTI tax. This phenomenon is de-
fined as “treasury transfer effect" since the rate reductions
in Canada would be in favour of the U.S. through the GILTI
tax.133 Canadian lawmakers should take this indirect effect
into consideration when responding to the U.S. tax reform to
avoid any counterproductive consequences.
With the introduction of TCJA, the thin capitalisation
rules in the U.S. have been tightened. This can result with
U.S. based MNEs shifting their debt to affiliates in other ju-
risdictions such as Canada, to reduce their debt ratio in the
U.S. If the Canadian government does not respond with a
policy change, the country would then encounter losses of
its tax revenue. Furthermore, it has been also found that
tighter thin capitalisation rules result with MNEs substitut-
ing regulated forms of debt with unregulated ones. In this
alternative strategy, they choose to issue loans in the name of
affiliates in jurisdictions with looser rules.134 Thus, in order
to limit aggressive debt shifting towards its territory, Canada
should tighten its thin capitalisation rules as well.
As indicated earlier, Canada and the U.S. have, at least on
the surface level, very similar transfer pricing rules, whereby
both countries’ accepted transfer pricing methods are in ac-
cordance with the arm’s length principle. TCJA’s newly in-
troduced provisions such as FDII and GILTI rules had effects
on transfer pricing, nevertheless, these effects were indirect.
Thus, regarding the transfer pricing rules, there are not any
lessons for Canada that can be derived from the provisions of
the U.S.
As stated above, with regard to the criteria 3.4.5 “treaty
network", Canada has a better standpoint than the U.S., since
the country has currently more bilateral tax treaties in force.
However, some observers argue that the strong dependence
of Canada to its biggest trade partner, the U.S., can be prob-
lematic. An example from the recent past is the steel and
aluminium tariffs imposed on goods of Canadian exporters
by the U.S. government. To eliminate the potential risk that
rises due to political turmoil, Canada should try to develop
its relationships with other emerging market economies such
as China and Mexico.135
Apart from the lessons that are derived from the compar-
ison criteria chosen for this thesis, there are other key areas
that Canadian lawmakers should consider. Over the years
many provisions were added to ITA which ended up with
complicating the income tax system. Critics suggest that sim-
plifying ITA would increase the tax attractiveness of Canada
in the eyes of the MNEs.136 When employing these neces-
sary and long overdue changes, the current situation should
also be taken into consideration. Since the Coronavirus pan-
demic is expected to have fundamental changes in societies,
133See McKenzie and Smart (2019b, pp. 13–15, 20–21).
134See Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser (2012, pp. 930–38), as
cited in McKenzie and Smart (2019a, p. 8).
135See The Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce
(2018, pp. 20–22).
136See The Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce
(2018, pp. 9–11).
the need for an internationally competitive tax system that
encourages innovation and investment is more crucial than
ever.137
5. Conclusion
This thesis aimed to assess the similarities and differences
of MNEs’ income taxation in the U.S. and Canada after the
U.S. tax reform. Based on the 12 corporate taxation criteria
that determine the tax attractiveness of jurisdiction, the cor-
porate taxation systems have been compared. It concludes
that, as expected, despite many similarities of the fundamen-
tal fiscal aspects of both countries, their tax systems differ.
It is not possible to uniformly declare the countries as simi-
lar or different, since some parameters are very much alike
between the two countries, whereas others are completely
diverse. These differences have been heightened with the en-
actment of TCJA. Furthermore, this thesis had the intention
to derive lessons for Canada from the U.S. corporate taxation
system. By inferring to its own comparison, this objective is
fulfilled in a unique and first-of-its-kind manner.
Basic elements differ considerably between both coun-
tries, whereby the most significant advantage of Canada,
lower corporate income tax rate, disappeared with TCJA.
On the other hand, group taxation provision of the U.S. is
an important edge over Canada from the perspective of tax
attractiveness. With regard to cost recovery, both countries’
tax systems were influenced heavily from TCJA, whereby
the immediate temporary steps that Canada took with the
Fall Economic Update to keep up with the changes of TCJA
require further development. The category of tax incentives
harboured most of the similarities between the two tax sys-
tems. In the future, in order to promote innovation even
further in their jurisdictions, the U.S. and Canada should
continue to develop their tax incentives. The broad category
of international tax regulations demonstrates on the surface
level that both countries are strict with their efforts to prevent
illegitimate tax planning strategies, but they are also trying
to preserve their tax attractiveness for MNEs’ investment
purposes. With reference to the latter, the new provisions
that the U.S. has implemented with the tax reform could be
a threat to Canada’s tax attractiveness. The last part shows
that there are many steps that Canada can take to rebuild
its competitive position against the U.S., hence an action of
Canadian policymakers in retaliation to TCJA has become
necessary.
It is an undeniable fact that the more detailed the con-
ducted analysis is, the larger the divergencies of both coun-
tries’ corporate taxation systems are going to be; since it is
essentially impossible to have two entirely matching taxation
systems. But a comparison that considers the fundamental
aspects of each criterion allows to see the broader picture.
Hence, the methodology chosen for this thesis adequately
137See Canadian Chamber of Commerce (2020, pp. 1, 8); Canadian Cham-
ber of Commerce (2018, pp. 5–6).
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shows similar and different aspects without excessively scru-
tinising and makes the comparison available for further re-
search.
As stated repeatedly throughout this thesis, based on
the conclusions, policymakers of Canada should consider
promptly reforming their tax system. Moreover, policymak-
ers worldwide should bear these comparison criteria in mind
when trying to assess how attractive their tax systems are
from the standpoint of corporate taxation. MNEs can also
refer to this comparison when making their own investment
decisions. Hence, this comparison between the U.S. and
Canada could act as a role model for both governments and
businesses. Further research is however needed to actually
form the structure of a possible Canadian tax reform. In
this regard, before implementing any changes it is also re-
quired to assess how the implications of a reform as such are
expected to be.
The corporate landscape today is prominent with its great
degree of global integration. This makes the previously do-
mestically organised corporate taxation a border-crossing
matter. It also obliges countries to arrange their tax systems
in a way that it pleases multinational corporations. In this
race between governments to make their countries attractive
investment hubs, the relativity factor plays a major role, since
during decision process companies are often undecided be-
tween two jurisdictions. In the future, it is desirable to have
tax systems that simultaneously preserve the governments’
interests while providing attractive tax environments for
companies to invest in. In this regard, the U.S. and Canada
have the potential to set the example that lawmakers around
the world are hoping to see because as it is impossible to have
economic growth without investments, it is also certainly not
possible to draw investments without a correct tax policy.
E. Gürlek / Junior Management Science 6(3) (2021) 489-506504
References
Alberta Printed Circuits Ltd. v. The Queen. (2011). No. 2008- 714(IT)G (Tax
Court of Canada).
Arnold, B. J. (2012). A Comparative Perspective on the U.S. Controlled
Foreign Corporation Rules. Tax Law Review, 65(3), 473–503.
Aronshtam, N., & Kane, M. (2018). Survey of Global Investment and Innova-
tion Incentives. Deloitte.
Arrow, K. (1962). Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for In-
vention (Vol. The Rate and Direction of Incentive Activity: Economic
and Social Factors; Universities - National Bureau Committee for Eco-
nomic Research and Committee on Economic Growth of the Social
Science Research Council, Ed.).
Atkinson, R. D. (2015). An Easy Checkoff for Global Competitiveness: The
Case for a U.S. Innovation Box. Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation.
Ault, H. J., Arnold, B. J., & Cooper, G. S. (2019). Comparative Income
Taxation: A Structural Analysis (4th ed.). Alphen aan den Rijn, [ND]:
Kluwer Law International.
Avi-Yonah, R. S., & Pichhadze, A. (2017). GAARs and the Nexus between
Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Drafting: Lessons for the
U.S. from Canada. Accounting, Economics, and Law, 7(1), 165.
Bazel, P., Mintz, J., & Thompson, A. (2018). 2017 Tax Competitiveness Report:
The Calm Before the Storm. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/sppp
.v11i0.43270
Behrens, K., Peralt, S., & Picard, P. M. (2014). Transfer Pricing Rules, OECD
Guidelines, and Market Distortions. Journal of Public Economic The-
ory, 16(4), 650–680. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/3665873
Berk, J., & DeMarzo, P. (2017). Corporate Finance (4th ed.).
Betker, B. L. (1995). An Empirical Examination of Prepackaged Bankruptcy.
Financial Management, 24(1), 3–18. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/
3665873
Brackman, S. (2016). Taxes in the United States : Developments, Analysis and
Research. New York, [US].
Bradley, S., Dauchy, E., & Robinson, L. (2015). Cross-Country Evidence on
the Preliminary Effects of Patent Box Regimes on Patent Activity and
Ownership. National Tax Journal, 68(4), 1047–1071.
Braun, J., & Fuentes, D. (2016). The Effects of Double Tax Treaties for
Developing Countries. A Case Study for Austria’s Double Tax Treaty
Network. Public Finance and Management, 16(4), 383–433.
Brauner, Y. (2011). Policy Forum: Taxation of Corporate Groups - Lessons
from the United States. Canadian Tax Journal, 59(2), 295–314.
Brauner, Y. (2017). Tax Treaty Disputes in the United States. In E. Baistroc-
chi (Ed.), A Global Analysis of Tax Treaty Disputes (pp. 17–64). Cam-
bridge, [UK]. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316528945.002
Brazell, D. W., & Mackie, J. B. (2000). Depreciation Lives and Methods:
Current Issues in the U.S. Capital Cost Recovery System. National
Tax Journal, 53(3), 531–561.
Brown, K. B. (2012). Regulation of Corporate Tax Avoidance. In K. B. Brown
& D. V. Snyder (Eds.), General Reports of the XVIIIth Congress of
the International Academy of Comparative Law/Rapports Généraux
du XVIIIème Congrès de l’Académie Internationale de Droit Comparé
(pp. 609–624). Dordrecht, [NL]. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/
978-94-007-2354-2_27
Buettner, T., Overesch, M., Schreiber, U., & Wamser, G. (2012). The Impact
of Thin-Capitalization Rules on the Capital Structure of Multinational
Firms. Journal of Public Economics, Fiscal Federalism, 96(11), 930–
938. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.06.008
Bunn, D., & Asen, E. (2019). International Tax Competitiveness Index 2019.
In Tax foundation. Washington D.C. [US].
Burman, L., & Slemrod, J. (2013). Taxes in America: What Everyone Needs
to Know. New York, [NY].
Canada Revenue Agency. (2005). Corporation Tax Rates. Re-
trieved 2020-05-18, from https://www.canada.ca/en/
revenue-agency/services/tax/businesses/topics/
corporations/corporation-tax-rates.html
Canada Revenue Agency. (2017). Line 25200 - Non-Capital Losses





Canada Revenue Agency. (2020). Scientific Research and Experimental




Canada v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc. (2012). No. 33874 (Supreme Court of
Canada).
Canadian Chamber of Commerce. (2018, 10 Ways to Build a Canada That
Wins).
Canadian Chamber of Commerce. (2020). Roadmap to Recovery.
Christians, A. (2018). Taxing Transnationals: Canada and the World, Canada
in International Law at 150 and Beyond Paper, p. 1–11 (No. 15). On-
tario, [CA].
Clark, W. S., & Klemm, A. (2015). Effective Tax Rates for Multinationals -
The Role of Tax Incentives and Tax Planning Policy Forum. Canadian
Tax Journal, 63(1), 133–148.
Clifford, S. (2019). Taxing Multinationals beyond Borders: Financial and
Locational Responses to CFC Rules. Journal of Public Economics, 173,
44–71. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.01.010
Cockfield, A. J. (2017). Tax Treaty Disputes in Canada. In E. Baistrocchi
(Ed.), A Global Analysis of Tax Treaty Disputes (pp. 116–171). Cam-
bridge, [UK]. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316528945.004
Correa, P., & Guceri, I. (2013). Tax Incentives for Research and Develop-
ment, Innovation, Technology and Entrepreneurship Policy Note 4.
Washington D.C., [US]: World Bank.
Daniels, J. P., O’Brien, P., & von der Ruhr, M. B. (2015). Bilateral Tax Treaties
and US Foreign Direct Investment Financing Modes. International
Tax and Public Finance, 22(6), 999–1027. doi: https://doi.org/10
.1007/s10797-014-9340-1
Deloitte. (2020). Jurisdiction: Deloitte International Tax Source.
Retrieved 2020-06-15, from https://www.dits.deloitte.com/
#Jurisdiction/98
De Luca, A., Aronshtam, N., Boivin, L., Lamontagne, l.-N., Lassonde, J.,
McKindsey, D., . . . Robertson, S. (2016). Canada’s First Patent Box
Regime - an Incentive for Domestic R&D Commercialization. Deloitte,
R&D Tax Update.
De Luca, A., & Hausch, J. (2017). Policy Forum: Patent Box Regimes -
A Vehicle for Innovation and Sustainable Economic Growth Policy
Forum. Canadian Tax Journal, 65(1), 39–60.
Department of Finance Canada. (2018). Investing in Middle Class Jobs.
Department of Finance Canada. (2019). Tax Treaties. Retrieved 2020-06-
15, from https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/
programs/tax-policy/tax-treaties.html#status
Donnelly, M., & Young, A. (2002). Policy Options for Tax Loss Treatment:
How Does Canada Compare? Canadian Tax Journal, 50(2), 429–
488.
Dueñas, S. (2019). CFC Rules Around the World. Fiscal Fact, Tax Foundation.
Duke of Westminster v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue. (1935). No. 19
TC 490 (Court of Appeal England and Wales).
Dumalski, M., & DeGrace, D. (2019). Canada Highlights 2019. Tax Guides
and Highlights. Deloitte.
Ernst & Young LLP. (2019a). Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide: Canada.
Ernst & Young LLP. (2019b). Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide: The United
States.
Fischer, A. (2015). A Comprehensive Approach to Stateless Income Note.
George Washington Law Review, 83(3), 1028–1057.
Gale, W., Gelfond, H., Krupkin, A., Mazur, M. J., & Toder, E. (2018). A Pre-
liminary Assessment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. National
Tax Journal, 71(4), 589–612.
Goodlatte, R. B. (2015). H.R.9 - Innovation Act.
Goulding, C. R., & Goulding, C. G. (2013). R&D Tax Credit Fundamentals.
Corporate Business Taxation Monthly, 14(9), 17–18.
Gregory v. Helvering. (1935). No. 293 u.s. 465 (Supreme Court of the United
States).
Harris, P. A., Keen, M., & Li, L. (2019). Policy Forum: International Effects
of the 2017 US Tax Reform - A View from the Front Line. Rochester
NY, [US]: Social Science Research Network, SSRN Scholarly Paper.
Hashimzade, N., & Epifantseva, Y. (2017). The Routledge Companion to
Tax Avoidance Research. The Routledge Companion to Tax Avoidance
Research. doi: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315673745
Hoppe, T., Schanz, D., Sturm, S., & Sureth-Sloane, C. (n.d.). Tax Complexity
E. Gürlek / Junior Management Science 6(3) (2021) 489-506 505
Index. Retrieved 2020-05-20, from https://www.taxcomplexity
.org/
Internal Revenue Service. (2019a). Publication 536 (2019), Net Operat-
ing Losses (NOLs) for Individuals, Estates, and Trusts | Internal Rev-
enue Service. Retrieved 2020-06-16, from https://www.irs.gov/
publications/p536
Internal Revenue Service. (2019b). Publication 542 (01/2019), Corporations
| Internal Revenue Service. Retrieved 2020-05-18, from https://
www.irs.gov/publications/p542
Kujinga, B. T. (2012). Analysis of Misuse and Abuse in Terms of the South
African General Anti-Avoidance Rule: Lessons from Canada. The
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, 45(1),
42–63.
Kunka, P., Stasio, A., & Zagler, M. (2020). On the Relevance of Dou-
ble Tax Treaties. International Tax and Public Finance, 27(3), 575–
605. doi: http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/10.1007/
s10797-019-09570-9
Laplante, S. K., Skaife, H. A., Swenson, L. A., & Wangerin, D. D. (2019).
Limits of Tax Regulation: Evidence from Strategic R&D Classification
and the R&D Tax Credit. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,
38(2), 89–105. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2019.02
.003
Larsen, P. o., Cordero, L. F., Bowen, M. J., Denault, A. M., & D’Alessandro Jr.,




Luscombe, M. A. (2020). Analyzing Net Operating Loss Options in 2020.
The Tax Magazine, 98(6), 3–4, 49.
Marley, P., & Tremblay, R. G. (2005). Canada’s Offshore Anti-Avoidance
Rule Should Receive Narrow Interpretation. Tax Management Inter-
national Journal, 34(2), 105–108.
McCaffery, E. J. (2012). The Oxford Introductions to U.S. Law : Income Tax
Law. Oxford, [UK].
McGill, S. P., Karch, G. C., Feeley, K. J., O’Banion E., S., & Crouse, J. G.
(2018). GILTI Rules Particularly Onerous for Non-C Corporation CFC
Shareholders. International Tax Journal, 44(1), 11–14, 42.
McKenzie, K., & Smart, M. (2019a). Policy Forum: Business Tax Reform in
the United States and Canada. Canadian Tax Journal, 67(1), 57–66.
doi: 10.32721/ctj.2019.67.1.pf.mckenzie
McKenzie, K., & Smart, M. (2019b). Tax Policy Next to the Elephant: Busi-
ness Tax Reform in the Wake of the US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. C.D.
Howe Institute.
Merlo, V., & Wamser, G. (2014). Debt Shifting and Thin-Capitalisation Rules.
DICE Report, 12(4), 27–31.
Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Definition of Pass-Through Entity.. Retrieved 2020-
06-01, from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
pass-throughentity
Nam, C. W., & Radulescu, D. M. (2005). The Role of Tax Depreciation for
Investment Decisions: A Comparison of European Transition Coun-
tries. Eastern European Economics, 43(5), 5–24.
Nitikman, J. A. (2000). The Interaction of Canada’s Thin Capitalization
Rule and the Canada - United States Tax Treaty. The International
Tax Journal, 26(1), 20–64.
Nosikova, Y. (2015). The FAPI Regime and CFC Rules under the BEPS Action
Plan 3: Where Does the Business of "Managing Intellectual Property"
Stand? University of Victoria Faculty of Law.
OECD. (2015). Action 5: Agreement on Modified Nexus Approach for IP
Regimes, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project. Paris,
[FR]: OECD Publishing.
OECD. (2017a). Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed
Version 2017. Paris, [FR]: OECD Publishing. doi: http://dx.doi.org/
10.1787/mtc_cond-2017-en
OECD. (2017b). OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises and Tax Administrations. Paris, [FR]: OECD Publishing. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/tpg-2017-en
OECD. (2019). R&D Tax Incentives: United States 2019, Directorate for Sci-
ence, Technology and Innovation. Paris, [FR]: OECD Publishing.
OECD. (2020). Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate. Retrieved 2020-06-20,
from https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=78166
Petrie, J. R. (1952). The Taxation of Corporate Income in Canada. Toronto,
Ontario [CA].
Pomerleau, K. (2018). US Corporate Income Tax Now More Competi-
tive. Retrieved 2020-05-12, from https://taxfoundation.org/
us-corporate-income-tax-more-competitive/
Prebble, R., & Prebble, J. (2010). Does the Use of General Anti-Avoidance
Rules to Combat Tax Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule of Law
- A Comparative Study Critical Issues in Comparative & International
Taxation. Saint Louis University Law Journal, 55(1), 21–46.
PricewaterhouseCoopers International Ltd. (PwC). (2019). PwC
Worldwide Tax Summaries Canada - Corporate - Group Taxation.
Retrieved 2020-06-10, from https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/
canada/corporate/group-taxation
PricewaterhouseCoopers International Ltd. (PwC). (2020a). PwC World-
wide Tax Summaries: United States - Corporate - Deductions.
Retrieved 2020-06-15, from https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/
united-states/corporate/deductions
PricewaterhouseCoopers International Ltd. (PwC). (2020b). PwC World-
wide Tax Summaries United States - Corporate - Group Taxation.
Retrieved 2020-06-07, from https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/
united-states/corporate/group-taxation
Sarkar, S. (2014). Valuation of Tax Loss Carryforwards. Review of Quantita-
tive Finance and Accounting, 43(4), 803–828. doi: https://doi.org/
10.1007/s11156-013-0393-5
Schanz, D., Keller, S., Dinkel, A., Fritz, J., & Grosselfinger, C. (2017). Tax
Attractiveness Index: Methodology.
Shafer, J. (2013). Canada Expands Thin Capitalisation Rules. International
Tax Review, 24(10), 69–70.
Shaviro, D. (2018). The New Non-Territorial U.S. International Tax System.
In presented at the NYU Law School Oxford Academic Symposium. New
York NY, [US].
Sherlock, M. F., & Marples, D. J. (2019). Overview of the Federal Tax System
in 2019. Washington D.C., [US]: Congressional Research Service.
Shoven, J. B., & Whalley, J. (1992). Canada-U.S. Tax Comparisons, A Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Project Report. Chicago IL, [US].
Singer, J. M., Bray, R., Kershaw, D., Shulman, M., & Crouch, L.
(n.d.). Claiming Refunds for Corporate Net Operating Loss




SRED. (2017). SR&ED Vs. U.S. R&D Tax Credits: A Comparison. Re-
trieved 2020-06-09, from https://www.sreducation.ca/sred
-us-rd-comparison/
Stratton, T. (2019). 50 Years of Cutting and Pasting - Modernizing Canada’s
Tax System. Canadian Chamber of Commerce.
Streitferdt, F. G. (2013). The Valuation of Tax Loss Carryforwards. Jour-
nal of Business Valuation and Economic Loss Analysis, 8(1), 163–
184. doi: http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/10.1515/
jbvela-2013-0020
Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen. (1984). No. 16623 (Supreme Court
of Canada).
Suarez, S. (2019). Transfer Pricing in Canada. Tax Notes International,
96(9), 781–813.
Taklalsingh, R. (2019). Transfer Pricing Legislation: Effect on Multinational
Enterprises in the United States. Walden University.




The Economist. (1993). “Taxing Questions” .
The Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce. (2018).
Canada - Still Open for Business? Ottawa ON, [CA].
Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd. (n.d.). Loss Carry-Over Practi-
cal Law Canada. Retrieved 2020-06-16, from https://
ca.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-021-1214
?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)
Ting, A. (2013). The Taxation of Corporate Groups Under Consolidation : An
International Comparison. Cambridge, [UK]: Cambridge University
Press.
Traub, J., & Kummer, J. (2015). Innovation Boxes, International Tax Reform,
and Infrastructure Spending. The Pillars of this Fall’s Tax Legislative
E. Gürlek / Junior Management Science 6(3) (2021) 489-506506
Debate. Deloitte.
Tørsløv, T. R., Wier, L. S., & Zucman, G. (2018). The Missing Profits of Na-
tions. Cambridge MA, [US]: National Bureau of Economic Research,
NBER Working Paper Series w24701.
Trump, C. (2020). United States Highlights 2020. Deloitte,Tax Guides and
Highlights.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2018).
World Investment Report 2018: Investment and New Industrial Policies.
Geneva, [CH]: UNCTAD/WIR/2018.
United States - Canada Income Tax Convention . (1985). Washington D.C.
[US].
Waerzeggers, C., & Hillier, C. (2016). Introducing a General Anti-Avoidance
Rule (GAAR) - Ensuring that a GAAR Achieves Its Purpose (Vol. 1). Tax
Law IMF Technical Note, IMF Legal Department.
Wakabayashi, D., & Chen, B. X. (2018). Apple, Capitalizing on New
Tax Law, Plans to Bring Billions in Cash Back to U.S. - The
New York Times. The New York Times. Retrieved 2020-05-
26, from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/17/technology/
apple-tax-bill-repatriate-cash.html
Yang, J. G. S., Lord, R. A., & Saito, Y. (2019). Has the United States Really
Changed From a Worldwide to a Territorial Tax System? Journal of
Taxation of Investments, 36(4), 69–83.
Yang, J. G. S., Poon, W. W., & Chang, C. (2018). The Important Aspects and
Strategies of the TCJA. Practical Tax Strategies, 101(1), 16–23.
